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Introduction 
The use and efficacy of intervention in the foreign exchange market has been a controversial topic. 
Some think that this type of intervention is ineffective in influencing the level of the exchange rate, and 
can also be damaging, because it can increase the volatility of the rate. Others argue that intervention 
operations can influence the level of the exchange rate, and can help to calm disorderly markets. Yet, 
others argue that intervention operations are inconsequential, since they affect neither the level nor 
the volatility of exchange rates (Dominguez, 1998). No doubt, the observed disparate range of 
intervention policies between central banks, and within individual central banks over time, can in part 
be attributed to the different views concerning the effectiveness and consequences of central bank 
interventions. 
In this regard, the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la República) offers an interesting example of 
a variety of intervention policies that can be adopted according to changing market conditions and 
policy priorities. Following the introduction of a floating exchange rate regime and the adoption of an 
inflation targeting scheme for monetary policy, the central bank put in place in November 1999 an 
option-based foreign exchange intervention mechanism aimed at two objectives: firstly, accumulating 
foreign reserves and secondly, controlling the volatility of the exchange rate. Two years later, the 
central bank extended the option-intervention mechanism to also include reduction of foreign reserves, 
thus making the existing option mechanism fully symmetrical. More recently, in September 2004, 
facing an escalating appreciation of the currency, the Colombian central bank announced its decision 
to introduce direct and discretionary intervention operations. 
1.  The use of options for foreign exchange market intervention 
To our knowledge, the systematic use of options as a way of intervention in the foreign exchange 
market has only been used by the central banks of Colombia and Mexico. Currently, the central bank 
of Colombia might be the only one to maintain such a scheme.
3 The main characteristic of this 
mechanism is its transparency and reliance on an auction system. The intervention is carried out in an 
open manner and with rules that are public knowledge. The benefit of using options arises mostly from 
the associated hedging operations related to the risk management of option portfolios. 
By law, the Board of Governors of the central bank is directly responsible for exchange rate policy. 
However, through the Finance Minister - as one of the seven members of the Board - the government 
participates in intervention decisions. The central bank executes intervention in an independent 
manner and both the Treasury and the Colombian oil company are treated in the same way as any 
other market agent. 
The objectives of intervention are: 
•  To avoid excessive movements of the nominal exchange rate in a manner consistent with 
achieving the inflation target; 
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•  To strengthen the international liquidity position of the country by accumulating foreign 
reserves without compromising the achievement of the quantitative inflation target or causing 
the exchange rate to deviate from its fundamental values; 
•  To moderate excessive and abrupt movements in the exchange rate from its recent trend. 
This is in order to avoid creating expectations of appreciation or depreciation that can result 
in a significant deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamentals. 
Currently, the Banco de la República has four types of options: two of them are intended for 
accumulating or decumulating international reserves and two for dampening excessive exchange rate 
volatility. Agents have access to these options only through auctions held by the central bank. 
•  Put options (call options) for accumulating (decreasing) international reserves. These options 
give the holder the right to sell (buy) foreign exchange to (from) the central bank. The 
amount of the options to be auctioned is set by the Board of Directors at its own discretion. 
The options are valid between the first and the last working day of the month immediately 
following the day of the auction (they have usually coincided with calendar months) or in the 
period specified in the announcement. The options can be exercised, partially or totally, 
during this period, as long as the condition for exercise is in place. The exercise condition for 
the put (call) option is that the representative market exchange rate (TRM, certified by the 
Banking Superintendence) be below (above) its 20 working day (arithmetic) moving average. 
The strike price of the option is the TRM of the exercise day. In the event that the put (call) 
options are totally exercised before their expiration date, the board of directors could 
announce new auctions. 
•  Put (call) options for controlling volatility of the exchange rate. These options can be held by 
the central bank the same day that the nominal exchange rate (TRM) is 4% or more below 
(above) its last 20 working day moving average. This condition also applies for the exercise 
of the option. The amount of the auction is set by the Board of Directors at its own discretion 
(it is currently set at US$ 180 million). The strike price of the option is the market exchange 
rate (TRM) of the exercise day. The options expire one month after the day of the auction. 
The central bank could call a new auction whenever the exercise condition is met (even if the 
options that were auctioned have not expired). The amount of these new volatility options is 
announced at the same time that the auctions are called. 
Dutch auctions are used for all interventions through options. Premiums are ordered from the highest 
to the lowest. Bids equal to or higher than the premium at which the amount offered is covered are 
granted at this premium. Each participant may include up to five bids with the restriction that, in 
aggregate, these may not exceed the total offered amount. The institutions that are allowed to 
participate in the auctions include the Treasury and the “foreign exchange market intermediaries”, the 
latter excluding brokers and retail currency exchange houses (bureau de change). On some occasions 
the Board of Directors announces auctions for put options, to accumulate foreign reserves, months in 
advance. 
The use of public auctions of options enhances the visibility and openness of the foreign exchange 
intervention mechanisms for markets. It also gives Banco de la República the discretion to choose the 
timing and amount of foreign reserve adjustment. These decisions are usually taken at the monthly 
meeting where the Board of Directors analyses the inflation report. In auctions for volatility control, 
Banco de la República’s discretion is limited to fixing ex-ante the amount offered per auction and the 
tolerated deviation of the exchange rate from its 20-day moving average. After these parameters have 
been set, the auctioned call and put options to control foreign exchange volatility are triggered 
automatically. 
Banco de la República also has the discretion to announce the amounts awarded in the auctions. In all 
cases, the intervention amount is announced to the public the same day that the option is executed by 
any of its holders. No entity or individual outside the central bank is supposed to have access to 
privileged information. Only two types of information are not disclosed: the name of the institution that 
exercised the option and the nature of the intervention (whether or not it has been sterilised). 
However, information on the level of reserves and the monetary base is published weekly on the 
central bank’s website with a delay of eight days. This allows market participants to infer the amount 
and nature of the intervention. Afterwards, information on whether the intervention was sterilised is 
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Annex Table A shows the frequency of intervention in the foreign exchange market. Overall, since the 
introduction of the option mechanism, the central bank has intervened 51 times, 45 of them to build up 
international reserves through put options. 
Put options 
As can be seen from Annex Table A, between November 1999 and September 2002, auctions of put 
options were performed on a monthly basis, with amounts that ranged between US$ 30 million and 
US$ 200 million. The regularity in the use of this type of options throughout this initial period 
responded to the need to build up international reserves, following the reduction that took place during 
the defence of the currency band in 1998 and the first three quarters of 1999. By using put options, the 
central bank of Colombia was able to meet the targets of international reserves established in the 
programme with the IMF approved in late 1999. Between its creation and the end of 2002, auctions of 
put options amounted to US$ 1,879.7 million, of which US$ 1,399.3 million (74.4 %) were exercised. 
The ample volume of capital flows to emerging markets since mid-2003 and the sharp fall of spreads 
on sovereign debts translated into an appreciating trend of the exchange rates of these economies. 
The Colombian monetary authorities considered this as a temporary phenomenon, since a rise in 
US rates was anticipated. This view was reinforced by local factors, such as an expected decrease in 
both the volume of oil exports and the external financing of the public sector. In this context, the 
Central Bank decided in December 2003 to reinitiate a sustained intervention through auctions of put 
options to accumulate international reserves. As a result, between December 2003 and August 2004 
US$ 1.75 billion  of  put  options  were auctioned, of which US$  1.5  billion were exercised (a 13.7% 
increase over the level of international reserves at the end of 2003). The objective of this substantial 
intervention was to further strengthen the liquidity foreign position of the central bank, as well as to 
prevent an abrupt and temporary appreciation of the exchange rate. Such continued intervention was 
not considered incompatible with the monetary policy stance, since inflation forecasts at the beginning 
of 2004 showed an undershooting of the inflation target for 2004 and 2005. In any case, to assure 
monetary consistency, the central bank sterilised about 50% of the monetary expansion through the 
selling of Treasury bills in the secondary market. 
Call options 
Between July and September of 2002 the Colombian currency depreciated 15% in real terms. This 
was not an isolated event, but part of a generalised phenomenon in Latin America associated with the 
so called “Lula effect” and perhaps with the corporate scandals in the US that induced international 
investors to move toward safer assets. These changes were also reflected in the evolution of the 
sovereign spreads (the EMBI Plus raised by 400 basis points). Although the pass-through in Colombia 
was relatively low (of around 0.04), it was large enough to jeopardise the achievement of inflation 
targets, despite an estimated negative output gap of around 2.5% (Ramírez, 2004). 
In these circumstances, the Board announced in February 2003 its decision to decumulate up to 
US$ 1 billion (9.2% of total international reserves), without specifying any period of time. From this 
amount, the Central Bank effectively auctioned call options by a total of US$ 600 million during March, 
April and May 2003, with an offered sum of US$ 200 million each month. Only US$ 345 million of that 
total was exercised. These interventions were aimed at curbing the increasing depreciation trend, 
which was judged to be incompatible with the achievement of the inflation target. It has been 
considered that the most important effect of this intervention on the exchange rate was associated with 
the announcement rather than with the intervention itself. 
Volatility options 
The volatility control mechanism through call options was automatically activated in July, August and 
October 2002, by an amount of US$ 180 million each time. From a total auction of US$ 540 million, 
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2.  Effectiveness of the foreign exchange intervention 
The option-intervention mechanism was not designed to target any specific level of the exchange rate. 
In the case of put options for instance, their amounts auctioned in the market have usually been below 
one third of the average daily turnover. The central bank buys dollars at the official exchange rate 
determined by market transactions of the day before. These options have a one month maturity and 
they can only be exercised when the exchange rate falls (appreciates) below its 20-day moving 
average. With all these features, the exchange rate can substantially appreciate in periods in which 
put options are operating. 
Thus, put options must not be judged for their effects on the exchange rate, but rather for their 
performance as a mechanism for reserve accumulation. From this point of view, the objective of this 
type of intervention has largely been achieved. As is shown in Annex Table A, nearly US$ 3.2 billion in 
reserves have been bought since put options were introduced. The use of this mechanism and the 
returns obtained from central bank investments have allowed Colombia to substantially increase its 
foreign reserves, up to a level that comfortably conforms to international precautionary standards. At 
no point have the central bank or the markets deemed that this reserve accumulation could jeopardise 
the achievement of the inflation target. 
Call options to sell international reserves have been oriented towards influencing the exchange rate 
(although not necessarily pursuing any specific exchange rate level). In fact, as discussed above, 
these options were intended to bring under control an increasing depreciation trend that was deemed 
at the time to be jeopardising the achievement of the inflation target. Accordingly, the success of these 
interventions must be assessed in terms of their ability to stop the depreciation trend. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the nominal exchange rate stabilised immediately after the announcement 
of the call auction in mid February 2003 and then it began to appreciate slowly. The auction for foreign 
reserve deployment was made public jointly with the decision of the Board of Governors to sell up to 
US$ 1,000 million through this mechanism. These announcements came after a 100 basis point hike 
in the Bank’s interest rate in January 2003 that was followed by another one of the same magnitude in 
April 2003. 
With a stable exchange rate and with food prices falling, inflation and inflation expectations slowed 
down and then started to fall. In view of this behaviour, the Board suspended call options in June 
2003. Total inflation at the end of 2003 was 6.49 percent, just 49 basis points above the upper limit of 
the target range (5-6%). This was achieved in a year in which the value added tax of some products 
was increased and during which there was a large increase in utilities and gas prices. In this way, 
intervention in the foreign exchange market served as a complement, not as a substitute, of the 
monetary policy tools of the central bank. In fact, in conjunction with foreign exchange intervention, the 

























































































































Central bank announces call 
options for US$ 1,000 million 
 BIS Papers No 24  143
 
On the other hand, the central bank's volatility options prevented abrupt and excessive deviations of 
the exchange rate, once they were automatically triggered. To illustrate this, Annex Table B shows the 
daily representative exchange rate (TRM), and its deviation from its 20-day moving average between 
July and August 2002. As can be seen, the exchange rate did not deviate more than 4.3% from its 
moving average, subsequently appreciated 0.5% six days after the second volatility option was 
exercised, and then remained within 2.5% of its moving average during the following weeks. A similar 
phenomenon was observed in October 2003 (not shown). In that sense, volatility options achieved the 
purpose for which they were designed. Nonetheless, there are doubts about the efficiency of the 
mechanism (as it can be very expensive if there is a strong devaluation of the peso) and whether they 
should or could be substituted with the options to accumulate and sell reserves. 
An alternative way of assessing the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention is by using the 
event analysis approach, as applied for Colombia by Ramírez (2004), following Edison et al (2003) 
and Mandeng (2003). Event studies rest on the actual observation of asset prices over relatively short 
time periods and are particularly helpful when, due to small samples, the use of more sophisticated 
techniques such as GARCH models is not feasible. The event window is set as the depreciation of the 
currency 20 days before intervention, during it, and 20 days after intervention. An intervention is said 
to be successful in the short term if the change in the exchange rate in the episode of intervention 
reverses the trend in the exchange rate from the previous 20 days. An intervention is said to be 
successful in the long run if the change in the exchange rate 20 days after intervention reverses the 
trend in the exchange rate prior to the intervention. An intervention fails (both in the short and long 
run) if there is no reversal in the trend of the exchange rate. Two intervention episodes are examined: 
call options (decumulation of international reserves) and call volatility options. 
The results are shown in Table 1. According to the criteria mentioned above, it can be said that call 
options to decumulate international reserves and call volatility options were successful both in the 
short and in the long run, which confirms the observation made before. Strictly speaking the 
performance of call volatility options should be assessed on the basis of a measure of volatility, rather 
than simply the trend of the exchange rate. Such an assessment was made by Mandeng (2003). It 
was found that the volatility options sold in July and October 2002 were moderately successful in 
meeting the objective, while those sold in August 2002 were unsuccessful. 
 
 
3.  Consistency of foreign exchange interventions with inflation targeting 
The consistency of foreign exchange interventions with inflation targeting (IT) depends on whether or 
not the intervention is supportive of policies for achieving the goals of IT. Accordingly, IT-consistent 
interventions should loosen/tighten monetary conditions when the inflation forecast is below/above the 
inflation target, and/or the output gap is negative/positive. Moreover, the interest rate has to be the 
principal instrument of monetary policy and possible interventions in the foreign exchange market 




















Call options (decumulation of international reserves)
03/03/2003 - 03-10-2003  65.0  2958 1.07 0.06 –0.72 yes yes
03/19/03 79.6  2956 0.72 –0.02 –1.21 yes yes
05/20/03 199.9  2875 –1.53 2.07 –1.58 no yes
Call (volatility) 
07/29/2002 - 03/10/2003  289.5 2596 8.53 3.24 1.91  yes  yes
10/02/2002  124.5 2885 7.69 1.22 –3.70  yes  yes
1  Short-term effectiveness determined by whether direction of change in exchange rate on day of intervention reverses trend in 
exchange rate from previous 21 days.   
2  Long-term effectiveness determined by whether direction of change in exchange rate 
21 days after intervention reverses trend in exchange rate from previous 21 days.
Source : Ramírez (2004). 
Table 1
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ought to be only a complementary tool, and just in exceptional circumstances (high volatility, serious 
misalignments and/or disorderly market conditions). 
On this basis, Ramírez (2004) shows that interventions in Colombia have been “target and regime 
consistent”. Most of the time policy interest rates moved in the same direction, and changes in the 
monetary policy stance came first through changes in interest rates and then through interventions in 
the foreign exchange market (Table 2). 
 
 
Interventions to accumulate international reserves were carried out when the inflation forecasts 
pointed below target, and interventions to decumulate international reserves occurred in the opposite 
situation. Moreover, in each episode the Inflation Reports explicitly identified the exchange rate 
movements as one of the direct causes for target under or overshooting. The only exception was the 
case of intervention through volatility call options in 2002. However, the purpose of these interventions 
was different and cannot be judged with the same criteria. 
4. Direct  intervention 
On 29 September 2004, the Board of the Banco de la República announced its intention of buying up 
to US$ 1,000 million in the foreign exchange market during the last quarter of this year. It was decided 
to perform this intervention in a discretionary way - that is to say - not necessarily using the put options 
mechanism. This decision was motivated by the continuing real appreciation of the exchange rate over 
the last year and a half (between April 2003 and October 2004 the real exchange rate appreciated 
13.3 percent, Figure 2). The central bank of Colombia is aware that periods of prolonged appreciation 
in the past have resulted in a sharp deceleration of economic activity (1982-84) or even in an 
economic crisis (1998-99). 
For this reason, even if the Banco de la República does not have a specific target for the exchange 
rate, the Board decided to perform a direct intervention, in order to try to moderate the effects that this 
appreciation cycle could have on the tradable sector. The Board considered that given the lengthy 
appreciation process, put options were not the best suited mechanism for reserve accumulation, as 
that is an instrument better designed for offering a short term hedging, than for facing a sustained 













Interventions to decumulate int. reserves 
03/2003 2003  +122bp 50  bp –2.42% Up Yes 
2004 +68bp  –1.45%
05/2003 2003  +56bp 50  bp –2.30% Flat Yes 
2004 –36bp  –1.22%
Interventions to accumulate int. reserves 
10/2002 2003  –65bp  150/50 bp –1.64% Flat Yes 
12/2003 2004  –77bp  –0.36% Down  Yes 
01/2004 2005  –46bp  –0.78%
04/2004 2004  –15bp  –1.12% Down  Yes 
2005 –10bp  –0.86%
Interventions for volatiliy reasons 
06/2002 2003  –46bp  –2.43% Flat ? 
10/2002 2003  –65bp  –2.34% Flat ? 
Source: Ramírez (2004). 
Table 2 
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Figure 2 
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The Colombian experience with option-based exchange market interventions has fulfilled its 
objectives. The scheme has offered economic agents a practical instrument of risk coverage against 
unexpected exchange rate fluctuations. By using put options it has been possible to accumulate 
international reserves for about US$ 3.2 million without compromising the inflation target or affecting 
the trend of the exchange rate. Call options to sell reserves have been an important support for the 
implementation of monetary policy and the stability of the local currency. Finally, call-volatility options 





Foreign exchange market intervention* 
Put options to 
accumulate reserves 
Call options to 
sell reserves 














November   200.0   200.0       
December    80.0         
Total  2000   280.0   200.0       
January   80.0  12.0        
February    80.0         
March    100.0    74.0       
April    55.0         
May    100.0         
June    100.0    15.5       
July    100.0         
August   99.9  17.1        
September   100.0   100.0         
October   100.0   100.0         
November    100.0         
December    100.0    80.0       
Total 2001  1,114.9    398.6       
January   75.0  69.3        
February    50.0         
March    50.0         
April   30.0  30.0        
May   30.0  30.0        
June   30.0  30.0        
July   30.0  30.0        
August    80.0         
September   100.0   100.0         
October   140.0   140.0         
November   119.9   119.9         
December   50.0  50.0         
Total  2002   784.9   599.2       
January   49.9    1.5        
February   50.0  50.0         
March   100.0   100.0         
April   100.0           
May   100.0           
June   100.0           
July   50.0       180.0  180.0 
August   50.0        180.0 109.5 
September    50.0    50.0      
October         180.0  124.5 
November         
December    50.0        
Total  2003   699.9   201.5     540.0 414.0 
January           
February         
March     200.00  144.66     
April     200.00     
May     199.9  199.9    
June         BIS Papers No 24  147
 
Table A (cont) 
Foreign exchange market intervention* 
Put options to accumulate 
reserves 
Call options to sell 
reserves 














July   50.00    6.2      
August          
September          
October          
November          
December   300.0   300.0      
Total 2004    350.00    306.2  599.9  344.55    
January     200.0   200.0      
February          
March   200.0   200.0      
April   250.0        
May   200.0   200.0      
June   199.9   199.9      
July   199.8   199.8      
August   200.0   200.0      
September          
October          
Total   1,449.6   1,449.6      
Accumulated 
total   3,679.3   3,155.1  599.9 344.5 540.0 414.0 
*  US$ millions. 




Call volatility options 
Date  Exchange rate  Exchange rate TRM 





02-Jul-02 2398.80  1.5
03-Jul-02 2410.50  1.8
04-Jul-02 2425.40  2.2
05-Jul-02 2426.40  2.0
08-Jul-02 2434.30  2.1
09-Jul-02 2457.40  2.8
10-Jul-02 2462.20  2.8
11-Jul-02 2482.20  3.3
12-Jul-02 2506.80  4.0
15-Jul-02 2514.00  3.9
16-Jul-02 2507.20  3.4
17-Jul-02 2499.90  2.8
18-Jul-02 2524.80  3.5
19-Jul-02 2538.50  3.8
22-Jul-02 2529.60  3.1
23-Jul-02 2517.40  2.3
24-Jul-02 2539.00  2.9
25-Jul-02 2572.40  3.9
26-Jul-02 2580.20  3.8
29-Jul-02 2596.30  4.0 180 117 
30-Jul-02 2599.60  3.7
31-Jul-02 2625.10  4.3 63 
01/Aug/02 2636.30  4.3 180 69 
02/Aug/02 2640.40  4.0 17 
05/Aug/02 2643.00  3.7
06/Aug/02 2663.80  4.1
23.5  08/Aug/02 2670.60  3.9
09/Aug/02 2649.30  2.8
12/Aug/02 2568.80  –0.5
13/Aug/02 2595.80  0.4
14/Aug/02 2658.00  2.5
15/Aug/02 2635.90  1.4
16/Aug/02 2648.80  1.7
20/Aug/02 2663.60  2.0
21/Aug/02 2620.90  0.2
22/Aug/02 2626.20  0.2
23/Aug/02 2653.00  1.0
26/Aug/02 2643.40  0.5
27/Aug/02 2653.30  0.7
28/Aug/02 2672.30  1.3
29/Aug/02 2688.60  1.7
30/Aug/02 2712.50  2.5BIS Papers No 24  149
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